Social networks are composed of individuals with a variety of friendly and antagonistic relationships. There has been an increasing interest in the modeling and analysis of how opinions spread as a function of these relationships. In this paper, we propose a new simple and intuitive model that incorporates the socio-psychological phenomenon of the boomerang effect for driving the opinions of the members of the network. We prove the important result that, under certain conditions on the sign structures of the network for which structural balance is a particular case, the opinions in the network polarize. Compared to other models in the literature, our model displays a richer and perhaps more intuitive behavior of the opinions whenever the social network is not structurally balanced. In particular, we present some results whenever the network displays more than two factions (also known as clustering balance) and more arbitrary sign structures as a result of perturbation of initially balanced networks.
disagrees with a particular issue, and 1 that it completely agrees. One important question to answer is how the evolution and final distribution of opinions in a social network depends on the underlying network's topology and of the (positive) influence structure among the individuals. More recently, signed graphs were introduced into the opinion dynamics literature. Signed graphs represent a natural way to model positive and negative relationships among individuals. For example, a sociological relevant concept is structural balance, in which the members of a social network can either have only positive relationships or be divided in two factions in which members of the same faction have positive relationships but negative ones with members of the other faction. The seminal work by Altafini [4] proposed a continuous time model over a signed graph where the opinions can take any real value. It is shown that when the underlying graph satisfies structural balance, the opinions converge to bipartite consensus and polarize, i.e., all opinions have the same absolute value with their signs indicating which agents belong to the same faction (if there is one faction, all opinions have the same sign). A discretetime signed opinion model which is a counterpart of the Altafini model has also been proposed [11, 16] , in which bipartite consensus is also attained under structural balance. These two models have initiated a lot of research in the field of signed opinion dynamics, and are, arguably, the most popular models in the literature. Extensions of these models and further analysis have been done in the literature, as can be noted in the recent work [15] and the references therein. Note, however, that both Altafini models and their extensions present an unrealistic opinion vanishing behavior (i.e., the opinions converge to zero) whenever the property of structural balance is lost in the underlying social network.
Another class of models in opinions dynamics was proposed by Li et al. [13] and which is based on an extension of the voter model to signed graphs. In this model, individuals initially take binary opinion values (e.g., 0 and 1). Then, at any posterior time step, an individual is selected according to some process and will update her opinions by copying the same or the opposite opinion of one of its neighbors according to the the sign of their relationship. By design, opinions cannot vanish under generic signed networks; however, the opinion values are simply discrete. Whenever the graph satisfies structural balance, they showed that the opinions polarize: one faction takes one value, while the other faction takes the remaining one. Recently, Lin et al. [14] proposed a model which can be regarded as an extension to the one from Li et al. In this model, opinions can take m different discrete values from a set S. Then, an individual will copy the same opinion from a positive neighbor, but when facing a negative one, will randomly select an opinion different from that neighbor from the set S.
In this paper, we propose an opinion model over signed graphs such that the opinions are real numbers that can take any value in a specified closed interval and each edge of the graph indicates the friendly or unfriendly relationship between two individuals. Our model is inspired by the boomerang effect studied in social psychology [9, 7, 1] , which aims to explain why in some situations where two individuals engage in communication, they may not end up being in a better agreement but rather their attitudes become more dissentive, i.e., their opinions do not go in the intended direction (e.g., consensus or agreement) but in the opposite direction (e.g., polarization). The early work [12] suggested that this phenomenon can be explained by "the relative distance between subjects' attitudes and position of communication". Our model is motivated by the empirical observations in the social sciences (e.g., from the study of interpersonal attraction [5] ) two friendly agents will be closer in their attitudes and perspectives than two unfriendly agents. Specifically, we make the following assumption: whenever two agents who have a positive relationship interact, they are more agreeable and their opinions will become closer or even be in consensus, i.e., the opinion changes in the intended direction. On the other hand, whenever two agents with a negative relationship interact, the differences in their opinions will be more polarized after the interaction because of their increasing disagreement, i.e., the opinion changes in the opposite direction. Our opinion model captures such behavior mathematically, and we call it the affine boomerang model. Mathematically, our proposed model is an affine model, which makes it remarkably simple, and its dynamics are self-explanatory. Besides a linear model like the discrete Altafini model, this is, arguably, the next simplest model structurally.
Our second contribution is a formal analysis of our main result: under certain conditions on the sign structures of the network for which structural balance is a particular case, our model expresses opinion polarization, i.e., the opinions of two groups converge to opposite extreme values of the closed interval.
Finally, it is important to compare our model and the aforementioned models in the literature. Our model has the property that opinions do not necessarily vanish whenever the graph is not balanced, but, for example, can continue fluctuating inside the closed interval. The vanishing behavior, which we mentioned happens in both types of Altafini models and their extensions, has been interpreted as if the agents in the network become neutral or indifferent towards a specific topic. In the case of three antagonistic groups in a connected network, this would mean that all groups will end up having a zero valued opinion, i.e., they will have consensus on not having an opinion. This might be difficult to interpret. Instead, our proposed model predicts that two groups will polarize their opinions and the third one will continue fluctuating its opinions since its members observe people they dislike having opposite opinions. Thus, this third group cannot settle down to a definite opinion and its members are in persistent disagreement. This is, arguably, more intuitive since individuals of a social network can always hold an opinion, independently if their network is balanced or not. Moreover if we have an unbalanced network that differs from a balanced one in just the sign of one edge, it is not clear why that would drive the whole social network towards an indifferent opinion. Instead, our model suggests that opinions will fluctuate around extreme values of opinion, which is more intuitive since the underlying social network is approximately balanced.
The model
A signed graph G is an undirected graph with signed edges, i.e., with edge weights equal to either +1 or −1. Let E = E + ∪ E − be the edge set of G, where E + is the set of positive edges and E − the set of negative edges. G is complete whenever there exists an edge between any pair of vertices. An edge path from vertex i to j in G is a sequence of edges that connect a sequence of distinct vertices starting from i and finishing at j. A connected component of G is any subgraph such that all of its vertices are connected to each other by paths, but they are not connected to any other vertex of G. G is connected whenever it has only one connected component. We use the abbreviation i.o. to denote infinitely often.
We model the structure of a social network composed by agents as a graph. Then, throughout the paper, we use the words graph and network interchangeably, as well as the terms vertex and agent.
Each member of the network holds an opinion about a particular statement of a discussion topic, and her opinion describes how much she agrees with it. An agent i has an opinion x i ∈ [α, β]: x i = β whenever i completely agrees with the statement being discussed, and x i = α whenever she completely disagrees with it. The opinion vector x ∈ [α, β] n×1 has in its ith entry the opinion x i of agent i. If this property holds, then each connected component of G + is a faction. Lemma 1. Let G be a k-signed arranged network, for k ≥ 1. Assume each vertex of G has degree greater than or equal to two. Then: (i) if k ≤ 2, then G satisfies structural balance as in [8] , and (ii) if k ≥ 1, then G satisfies clustering balance as in [10] .
Note that a signed graph satisfying the k-sign arrangement property does not need to be complete. Assume that each agent has an initial opinion x i (0) ∈ [α, β], α < β, and a self-weight a i ∈ (0, 1). At each time step t ∈ Z ≥0 , select randomly an edge of G; assume each edge {i, j} has a time-invariant positive selection probability p ij . Update the opinions of the two agents i and j according to:
and similarly for agent j.
Note that the boomerang effect is captured by the last two cases of (1).
An example of selecting edges for the opinion updating is to do it uniformly as follows: let m be the number of edges in the graph (e.g., m = n 2 for complete graphs), then we can assign to all pair of agents the same probability of being selected, we have that p ij = 1/m for any pair {i, j}. Proof. We define a selection sequence by the selected edges in a given time frame (so that a selection sequence can be both finite or infinite). Let S denote the sample space of all possible selection sequences, F be the power set of S, and P be the probability for a sequence to happen, i.e., P[f ] = {i,j}∈f p ij for any f ∈ S (since S is a countable set, this probability measure is well-defined). Thus, we define the probability space (S, F, P).
We start by considering the case k = 1. In this case, the model is a linear system of the form
is a random matrix that takes, at each time step, the value I n×n −
whenever the edge {i, j} is selected to be updated, i.e., with probability p ij . With probability one, W (t) is a row stochastic matrix with a strictly positive diagonal for any t; moreover W (t) is independent and identically distributed for any t. Thus, E[W (t)] =W is a row stochastic matrix that, when interpreted as an adjacency matrix, corresponds to an undirected network. Under these assumptions [6, Theorem 12.1] implies the first statement of the theorem. Now we prove the case k = 2. Observe that any edge path from vertex i to vertex j is a selection sequence (but not all selection sequences are edge paths). Recall that edge paths are acyclic, i.e., no vertex can appear more than two times in the sequence.
We start by claiming that for any x(t), t ≥ 0, any 0 < < 1 and any pair of vertices i and j, there always exist a finite selection sequence s o ∈ S with ∆T number of elements, i.e., with length ∆T , such that |x i (t+∆T )−x j (t+∆T )| < if i and j belong to the same faction, and |x i (t+∆T )−x j (t+∆T )| > if i and j belong to different factions. Moreover, since s o is finite, P[s o ] > 0. Now we prove our claim.
Since the network satisfies the 2-sign arrangement, for any i and j that belong to the same faction, there exists a nonempty collection of edge paths P + i↔j between i and j in which each path contains only positive edges. Then, we can construct a finite sequence s o such that there exists some A ⊂ s o with A ∈ P + i↔j . This proves the first part of our claim. Now, we consider the case where i and j belong to different factions. Let P − i↔j be the nonempty collection of edge paths between i and j. Due to the structure of the network, any s ∈ P + i↔j must have an odd number of negative edges. Then, s can be partitioned as s = (∪ i s + i ) ∪ (∪ i s − i ), where any s + i is a sequence of edges in E + and any s − i ∈ E − , i.e., is a negative edge. From our discussion above, we can make the opinions of the agents participating in any sequence s + i arbitrarily closer, and the opinions of the agents in s − i arbitrarily apart. Then, it is possible to come up with a finite sequence of edges s o such that i and j become arbitrarily apart. This finishes the proof of our claim. In conclusion, it is always possible to make, under a finite selection of pair of vertices, any two vertices arbitrarily close if they belong to the same faction, or arbitrarily apart if they belong to different ones. We call this the finite-time proximity property. We make a last observation. If s o has infinite elements (i.e. is an infinite sequence), then Observe that x(t) ∈ [0, 1] n×1 for any t. Then, for any x ∈ [0, 1] n×1 , we define the variable Z : R n → {1, 2, 3} as (C1) Z(x) = 1 when arg max i x i and arg min i x i belong to the same faction;
(C2) Z(x) = 2 when arg max i x i and arg min i x i belong to different factions and there is no value τ > 0 such that one faction has all of its opinions above τ and the other faction has them equal or below it;
(C3) Z(x) = 3 there exists a value τ > 0 such that one faction has all of its opinions above τ and the other faction has them equal or below it.
Note that Z exhausts all possible situations for the values of the opinion vector x, and that (C1)-(C3) are independent events.
Assume that Z(x(t * )) = 3 for some t * < ∞. Let A be the faction such that x i (t * ) > τ for any i ∈ A;
and B the one such that x i (t * ) ≤ τ for any i ∈ B. If at t * +1 some i ∈ A and j ∈ B are selected, we have that x i (t * + 1) > x i (t * ) and x j (t * + 1) < x j (t * ). On the other hand, if at t * + 1 both i and j belong to the same faction, we have that min(
with equality if and only if x i (t * ) = x j (t * ). These observations along with the finite-time proximity property, let us conclude that with probability one, for any > 0, there exists a finite time T > t * such that |x i (t) − 1| < and |x j (t)| < for any i ∈ A, j ∈ B and t > T . Then, to finish the proof of our theorem, we only need to prove that, given any initial vector profile x o , there can always exist some finite random time T such that P[Z(x(T + t)) = 3|x(t) = x o ] = 1. Note that T depends on both
x o and the selected sequence of edges, so it is a random variable measurable with respect to P .
From the random selection process, it immediately follows that {x(t)} is a Markov process, i.e.,
3|Z(x(t)) = 1, x(t) = x o ] = 0, it follows that, given any ∆t > 0, the event {Z(x(t + ∆t)) = 3, Z(x(t + )) = 2, for any 0 < < ∆t|Z(x(t)) = 1} has zero probability. Therefore, we only need to prove that there always exist some random finite times ∆t 1 and ∆t 2 such that
for any t, then we have proved (i). Since {x(t)} is a Markov process, we only need to show that Finally, the last possible option for s o is to be a selection sequence such that it contains at least one pair {i, j} with i ∈ A and j ∈ B. Similarly, it can be argued that there exist infinitely many such sequences s o of infinite length, so that the event of their occurrence has also zero probability. Since we have shown that any s o ∈ S o is an infinite sequence, from our previous discussion, we conclude that
Using a similar analysis to the one above, we can show that P[T (t) < ∞] = 1 for any t, so that P[Z(x(t + T )) = 3, Z(x(t + )) = 1 with 0 < < T |Z(x(t)) = 2, x(t) = x o ] = 1 and thus prove (ii).
A consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that a complete social network with structural balance and two factions ends up having its agents with totally opposite opinions. This agrees with the intuitive result that antagonistic groups are expected to polarize opinions, as shown by other models in the literature [13, 15] . Also, as expected, if there are no negative relationships between the agents (i.e., there is only one faction), all agents reach consensus. (1) and assume x i (0) = 0 for any i ∈ F 1 , x i (0) = 1 for any i ∈ F 2 , and x i (0) ∈ (0, 1) for any i ∈ F k , k ≥ 3. Then,
This corollary states that if there are multiple antagonistic groups of people where two groups are already polarized in the opinion spectrum, the rest of agents will have their opinions always fluctuating. Intuitively, these agents cannot decide a definite opinion since they see people they dislike having completely opposite opinions. This fluctuation behavior of opinions has been observed in other models in the presence of stubborn agents [2] , where persistent disagreements due to stubbornness forbid the consensus of the system. Our work is the first one to propose persistent disagreements in the opinions based on the structure of friendly and antagonistic relationships in a social network.
Numerical results
For a balanced graph, which is a particular case satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.1, Figure 1 shows some example evolutions for self-weights a i = a ∈ (0, 1) for any agent i. We observed that, in general, the larger the self-weights, the more time the polarization process takes.
Now consider the case of multiple factions as in Corollary 3.2 and change the condition in its statement by |x i (0)| < τ 1 for any i ∈ F 1 , |x i (0) − 1| < τ 2 for any i ∈ F 2 , and x i (0) ∈ (τ 1 , 1 − τ 2 ) for any i ∈ F \ {F 1 , F 2 } and 0 < τ 1 , τ 2 < 1. Then, there is always a positive probability of avoiding the polarization of F 1 and F 2 ; however, this probability vanishes as τ 1 , τ 2 → 0. Figure 2 shows examples where two factions tend to polarize under generic initial conditions.
Finally, we provide numerical evidence of the behavior under networks that are the result of perturbations on balanced networks. Consider the situation where a complete and balanced social network that initially had two antagonistic factions is randomly perturbed by flipping the sign of some of its edges. Intuitively, we would expect that opinions, though not being able to polarize, would still "attempt" to be in such a state and fluctuate near extreme values if the perturbation is not too severe. Figure 3 shows some examples of this phenomenon. 0 < l a t e x i t s h a 1 _ b a s e 6 4 = " ( n u l l ) " > ( n u l l ) < / l a t e x i t > < l a t e x i t s h a 1 _ b a s e 6 4 = " ( n u l l ) " > ( n u l l ) < / l a t e x i t > < l a t e x i t s h a 1 _ b a s e 6 4 = " ( n u l l ) " > ( n u l l ) < / l a t e x i t > < l a t e x i t s h a 1 _ b a s e 6 4 = " ( n u l l ) " > ( n u l l ) < / l a t e x i t >
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Conclusion
We 
